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Abstract
Background: Autistic individuals commonly show circumscribed or “special” interests: areas of obsessive interest in
a specific category. The present study investigated what impact these interests have on attention, an aspect of
autistic cognition often reported as altered. In neurotypical individuals, interest and expertise have been shown to
result in an automatic attentional priority for related items. Here, we examine whether this change in salience is
also seen in autism.
Methods: Adolescents and young adults with and without autism performed a personalized selective attention task
assessing the level of attentional priority afforded to images related to the participant’s specific interests. In addition,
participants performed a similar task with generic images in order to isolate any effects of interest and expertise.
Crucially, all autistic and non-autistic individuals recruited for this study held a strong passion or interest. As such, any
differences in attention could not be solely attributed to differing prevalence of interests in the two groups. In both
tasks, participants were asked to perform a central target-detection task while ignoring irrelevant distractors (related or
unrelated to their interests). The level of distractor interference under various task conditions was taken as an indication
of attentional priority.
Results: Neurotypical individuals showed the predicted attentional priority for the circumscribed interest images but
not generic items, reflecting the impact of their interest and expertise. Contrary to predictions, autistic individuals did
not show this priority: processing the interest-related stimuli only when task demands were low. Attention to images
unrelated to circumscribed interests was equivalent in the two groups.
Conclusions: These results suggest that despite autistic individuals holding an intense interest in a particular class of
stimuli, there may be a reduced impact of this prior experience and expertise on attentional processing. The implications
of this absence of automatic priority are discussed in terms of the behaviors associated with the condition.
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Background
An intriguing feature of autism is the presence of areas of
intense interest in the vast majority of individuals with the
condition. Here, we examine how these interests are
reflected in autistic individuals’ perceptual processes, and
what implications this has for our understanding of
autistic cognition.
Autism is a developmental condition thought to affect
around 1% of the UK population [1, 2]. While the sever-
ity and symptom profile can vary across individuals,
autism is clinically defined by deficits in social commu-
nication and interaction, as well as the presence of re-
stricted, repetitive behavior, interests or activities (RRB)
[3]. The latter comprises aspects such as stereotyped or
repetitive movements and speech, insistence on same-
ness and altered sensory sensitivities. While these symp-
toms can be as problematic for autistic individuals as the
better-known social features of the condition [4], RRBs
can also manifest themselves as strong passions or
specific talents [5–7]. Referred to as circumscribed—or
special—interests, these passions generally involve an
intense level of interest in a narrow topic [8].
The evidence also points toward regular themes within
the topics of interest of individuals with ASD. Topics of
interests in autism tend to fall in non-social domains
and focus on science and technology-related topics,
which are not so popular among the typically developed
population. Examples include memorizing historical
dates and the periodic table and understanding how
mechanisms work [9]. Individuals with autism show a
strong tendency to read thoroughly around such topics,
and often focus on rote memorization of facts relating to
their circumscribed interest [10].
The proportion of individuals with autism that possess
a circumscribed interest is thought to be very high, with
research suggesting that 75% of children and 88% of
adolescents report a circumscribed interest or passion
[11]. Despite their prevalence, circumscribed interests
are rarely investigated: there is a disproportionally low
volume of published research in the area in contrast to
the other aspects of RRBs in autism. A search on
PubMed, for example, reveals 36 items for “autism” and
“circumscribed interests” versus over 550 for “autism”
and “repetitive behaviors”. The disparity in volume of re-
search on circumscribed interests compared with other
areas is particularly striking when one considers the po-
tential impact of special interests in educational and
clinical environments. Anecdotal evidence from the aut-
ism community suggests that personal identity is often
anchored in these interests and provides a focus for so-
cial interaction with caregivers and others. It has been
suggested that special interests can be used as a reward
to improve challenging behavior [12, 13] and also to in-
crease social engagement with peers [14, 15]. Further,
circumscribed interests have been successfully incorporated
into cognitive behavioral therapies used to treat anxiety in
children with autism [16, 17]. Conversely, circumscribed
interests have been associated with disruption to school-
work and social function [18, 19]. While it is not yet clear
whether circumscribed interests should be regarded as a
helpful or disruptive trait [20], their prevalence in autism
suggests that they might offer an insight into autistic cogni-
tion. To that end, the present study explored the relation-
ship between circumscribed interests and attention and
perception in the condition. Specifically, we examined the
impact of these interests on selective attention, a cognitive
process widely reported to be atypical in autism.
Selective attention, the process by which people are
able to attend and react to certain stimuli while ignoring
others [21], is a core component of our ability to
complete everyday tasks such as navigating through a
crowd or holding a conversation. Whether or not a
specific item is processed depends on its salience within
the environment. This salience can be dictated by either
top-down or bottom-up factors [22]. Bottom-up factors
(generally innate and universal) refer to the extent to
which a stimulus “pops out” from its surroundings, due
to differences in low-level features such as color or
shape [23]. For example, a red poppy in a green field of
grass will have salience due to its contrasting color. On
the other hand, top-down factors vary from person to
person, tend to be more goal-directed, and increase the
salience of stimuli that are relevant to one’s state or
experiences [24]. An individual with a passion for bird
watching might have his or her attention drawn toward
a particular species of bird in a tree, while others would
pay little attention to it. While bottom-up factors are
generally innate and universal, top-down factors vary
significantly from person to person and so an individ-
ual’s personal interests will influence perception in a
top-down manner. One universal top-down influence in
neurotypical individuals is the tendency to show a strong
preference for social stimuli: with face stimuli being
afforded attentional priority over other items. This
attentional bias has been found in newborns [25] and
continues throughout life.
Indeed, there appear to be neural regions dedicated to
the processing of social stimuli (e.g., faces), with a large
body of research revealing that the fusiform gyrus (FG)
is strongly implemented in a range of face processing
tasks [26–29]. In addition, it has been suggested that
these areas can be recruited in response to expertise in
other categories [30], with increased activation seen after
the acquisition of expertise with novel objects [31].
Similarly, car experts showed higher activation in the
right fusiform face area and occipital face area when
exposed to pictures of cars, compared to pictures of birds,
and bird experts showed the reverse effect [32].
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This may have implications for autism. While an at-
tentional bias toward faces has been robustly found in
the neurotypical population, these effects do not appear
to be present in autism. Individuals with autism have
been shown to display a reduced preference for faces
over objects [33, 34] as well as reduced activity in the
FG during exposure to faces [35] and no automatic pri-
ority for attention [36]. The apparent absence of this
specialization for social items raises two hypotheses: (1)
the lack of social specialization in autism reflects the re-
duced interest in social items, while the expertise in cir-
cumscribed interest topics would lead to specialization
and activations in the FG, or (2) there is reduced/absent
specialization in response to any class of item (related or
unrelated to personal interests). Lending initial support
for the former hypothesis, a case study of an individual
with autism found increased activity in the FG when
presented with images of “Digimon” cartoon character-
s—his special interest—but not when shown human
faces [37]. Likewise, recent work with a group of autistic
and non-autistic participants—both with interests—has
shown more robust responses to interests in the FG for
the autistic individuals [38]).
On a behavioral level, one way to explore the alterna-
tive hypotheses is to examine whether items related to
circumscribed interests show automatic top-down prior-
ity for attention over other objects—similar to the way
in which faces capture attention in typical individuals.
Here, we use the Load Theory of Attention and Cogni-
tive Control [39, 40] to investigate this. Load Theory as-
serts that the degree to which task-irrelevant stimuli are
processed is determined by the perceptual load of a task
(the amount of potentially task-relevant information).
When perceptual load is high, exhausting processing
capacity, irrelevant stimuli are ignored. Conversely,
when perceptual load is low, spare processing capacity
remains, and this spills over resulting in additional
irrelevant processing. The level of interference of task ir-
relevant stimuli and distractors decreases with increasing
perceptual load of the central task (e.g., [41–43]).
However, this modulation of attention by load is not
seen for social stimuli or stimuli related to areas of
expertise—both of which appear to capture attention ir-
respective of load level. When human faces were pre-
sented as distractors, offset from a central target
categorization task, their interference effect remained
constant—despite increasing perceptual load (additional
non-target elements) in the central task [44]. This result
supports previous findings that human faces have a spe-
cial saliency and are processed in an automatic and
mandatory fashion [26, 45]. Similarly, in expert musi-
cians, irrelevant pictures of musical instruments were
processed irrespective of load level [46]. This pattern
was not seen in non-musicians, suggesting that salience
is modified by expertise. As such, this framework can be
used to establish the relative salience of a class of stimuli
for each individual participant.
We have recently used this paradigm to examine
whether the same pattern of results is seen when autistic
individuals perform a task that involves social distractor
images. Results indicated that the autistic adults proc-
essed the face distractors in conditions of low load but
that this interference effect was eliminated under high
load. Unlike in neurotypical adults, there seemed to be
no “special salience” for the social items: those in the
autism group were able to ignore the irrelevant face
stimuli at higher levels of perceptual load while the non-
autistic controls remained distracted by them. On the
corresponding non-social task, the two groups per-
formed similarly: the distractor interference effect de-
creased as load increased [36]. The pattern observed for
items related to circumscribed interests in autism may
offer a resolution to the two opposing hypothesis out-
lined above. Given the high level of expertise, it seemed
likely that circumscribed interest items would show an
automatic priority for attention in autistic individuals.
However, if no such priority is seen, it may suggest an
absence of specialization to any class of stimuli based on
interest and expertise.
Previous literature on attention to circumscribed inter-
ests in autism is scarce. The few existing studies have
tended to employ preferential looking paradigms (using
eye-tracking techniques). Sasson and colleagues carried
out a series of studies that used a passive-viewing para-
digm to assess patterns of attention to non-social stimuli
using a mix of objects either related (e.g., trains, planes,
automobiles, etc.) or unrelated (e.g., plants) to typical
circumscribed interest topics in autism. Autistic children
showed a higher degree of exploration and fixation [47]
and increased self-reported preference (compared to
non-autistic controls) [48] for the items related to typical
circumscribed interests. When faces were presented
alongside non-social stimuli, the autism group showed
typical attention to faces when non-social items were
not connected to their interests but showed significantly
lower attention to faces when they were presented
alongside objects of interest [49].
Using a generalized stimulus set based on common
categories of interest, these studies offer preliminary evi-
dence that objects of interest have a special salience in
autism. Yet, despite having similar themes, we would ex-
pect there to be a large amount of heterogeneity in the
interests of the autism group. Therefore, while these
tasks may be able to detect overall group differences, it
is likely that some of the autism group will not possess a
genuine interest in the stimuli, leading to unnecessary
variance in the data and reduced validity of the task.
Secondly, as a disproportionately high number of autistic
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individuals have strong interests in comparison to the
neurotypical population, the effects found could in part
be attributed to group differences in interest strength or
presence of any strong interest as opposed to being
attentional differences unique to autism.
In the present study, we have developed a personalized
task that allows the systematic investigation of atten-
tional priority for each participant. Furthermore, we
have included a comparison group that was comprised
of neurotypical individuals with interests and passions.
In addition, by using the Load Theory paradigm, we can
specifically look at whether individuals are able to ignore
stimuli related to their circumscribed interest when they
have been explicitly instructed not to attend to them. In
such tasks, neurotypical participants have been shown to
automatically prioritize items related to their interests
and expertise, even at the expense of central-task
performance. These tasks have not yet been conducted
with autistic individuals and are distinct from the
free-viewing paradigms used previously to investigate
circumscribed interests, which have only assessed prefer-
ence for high interest items in the absence of task
demands. We predicted that, given all participants had a
passion/interest, both groups would show processing of
distractor images related to their interests under all
levels of load. This would be in contrast to the process-
ing of generic images, which would only be seen under
low load conditions.
A greater understanding of the attentional priority
given to circumscribed interests will offer insight into at-
tentional specialization in autism. Further, awareness of
exactly how circumscribed interests draw attention in
autism may allow them to be more effectively integrated
into behavioral and educational interventions.
Methods
Two experiments were carried out to assess whether
objects related to participants’ interests hold a different
salience to generic objects. This was done by measuring
the interference of both classes of stimuli on a selective
attention task.
Experimental stimuli
Stimuli were presented using the OpenSesame software
package [50] on a 15” Dell laptop. Participants were po-
sitioned with a 60 cm viewing distance from the screen.
An external keyboard was used to record button re-
sponses. During each trial, a target word was presented
in the center of the screen. In experiment 1, individual-
ized circumscribed interest words and distractor images
were used. These were related to each participant’s
individual interest (e.g., car manufacturer vs. motorbike
manufacturer for an automobile enthusiast). No social
items (faces) were included in the distractor images, to
ensure that the results would not be confounded by
social priority for attention in the non-autistic partici-
pants. For example, when the interest was Harry Potter
the stimuli were Hogwarts School house logos, items of
clothing, wands, etc. In experiment 2, the names of
stringed or wind instruments and an associated image
set (Wind: clarinet, horn, saxophone, trombone, trum-
pet, tuba; Stringed: banjo, bass, cello, guitar, harp, violin)
were used.
Participants were required to classify the word into
one of two categories. A set of six words from each cat-
egory was used throughout the task. The perceptual load
of the task was varied by presenting additional non-
words above and below the target word. There were four
levels of load: target word presented alone (set size 1),
target word and one non-word (set size 2), target word
and three non-words (set size 4) or target word and five
non-words (set size 6). All text was presented in size 23
sans-serif text in black against a gray background. In
addition to the word lists, corresponding distractor
images (in color) were also present in every trial. During
each trial, a distractor image measuring 4.1° × 3.3° visual
angles appeared alongside the word list. Distractor
images were presented to the left or right of the word
lists, 5° from the center of the screen (see Fig. 1).
These images were either congruent (from the same
category as the target word) or incongruent (alterna-
tive category to the target word). The task was split
into eight blocks (two of each set size) of 32 trials.
All trials were separated by the presentations of a
a
b
Fig. 1 Example of stimuli used in experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 2
(b). a A congruent trial of set size 4. b A congruent trial of set size 6.
For clarity, the examples are shown here without the gray background,
and in grayscale (full-color images were used in the experimental tasks)
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central fixation cross for 500 ms. Condition presentation
order, target position within the word list, and distractor
condition were all counterbalanced. Response time (RT)
and accuracy on each trial were recorded automatically
by the OpenSesame software package. Though an in-
direct measure, previous research suggests that RT
aligns with more explicit attention measures (e.g.,
awareness reports [51]) and is therefore considered
appropriate for the current study.
Procedure
Before starting the task, full-word lists were presented to
participants to ensure that they were familiar with all
items. Participants were instructed to locate the target
word among the non-words and to indicate which
category the word fell into with a button press. The re-
sponse buttons used were the left and up arrows. Indi-
vidualized stickers were placed on these keys for each
participant, showing a letter to represent the category
choice (e.g., “C” for cars or “M” for motorbikes). Partici-
pants were explicitly told to ignore the distractor images
and to complete the task as fast as possible. RT (mil-
liseconds from stimuli presentation) and accuracy
were recorded for each trial. Before taking part in the
main study, all participants completed a 16-trial prac-
tice block. Trials for all four set sizes appeared
equally in the practice block to allow participants to
experience all possible levels of perceptual load. Par-
ticipants were given a short break and encouragement
in between each block.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined whether an automatic priority
for attention is seen for images related to autistic and
non-autistic individuals’ specific interests. The categories
used within the task were specifically related to the in-
terests of each participant.
Participants
Fifteen adolescents/young adults with a diagnosis of aut-
ism (aged 13–32 years) and 17 non-autistic neurotypical
controls (aged 13–20 years) were recruited via schools,
personal contacts and advertisements (see Table 1 for
summary information). Sample size (accounting for
expected attrition) was determined by previous research
using similar paradigms [51]. IQ (all >80) was assessed
using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence
(WASI; [52]). The reading component of the tasks
restricted participation to those without intellectual im-
pairment. Groups were matched on age and non-verbal
IQ (using the Matrix Reasoning subtest of the WASI).
All participants in the autism group had previously
received a clinical diagnosis of an autism spectrum
condition from an independent qualified clinician in
accordance with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth or Fifth Edition [3, 53]. None
of the participants had any other neurological condition.
Diagnosis in autistic participants was confirmed by the
researchers using Module 4 of the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Scale (ADOS; [54]) and the Social Respon-
siveness Scale [55] was given to all control participants
to check for the possibility of undiagnosed cases. Two
individuals from the neurotypical group were excluded
due to high scores on the Social Responsiveness Scale
(SRS) (above “normal limits”, T score of >59). One indi-
vidual from the autism group was excluded due to being
unable to engage with the task correctly. T tests
indicated that IQ was higher in the neurotypical group
(p = .008), as was performance on the vocabulary subtest
of the WASI (p < .001). There was no difference in
WASI Matrix Reasoning scores (non-verbal subtest) or
in the age of the two groups (both p values >.6).
We specifically recruited people who had a strong
interest or passion (based on self report). We consider
this to be a key strength of our experimental design (as
discussed above); however, it undoubtedly made recruit-
ment more challenging and limited the sample sizes.
Once an individual was recruited, we spoke to them (or
their teacher/parent in the case of younger participants)
to determine what their passion was. There was some
overlap in the interests of the two groups (Premier
League Football; My Little Pony) and some interests that
were unique to individuals in the autism (Magic, Disney
Pixar films, trains, automobiles, various films/computer
games, comic books, World War II, Pokémon) or neuro-
typical group (Harry Potter, Cricket, Guns, Gymnastics,
Horses). A summary of the different individual interests
included in the study can be seen in Table 2.
Participant Assessment of Significance of Special Interests
and OccupatioNs (PASSION) questionnaire
In addition to the computer-based task, participants in
experiment 1 were asked to complete a short question-
naire to assess the intensity of their interest in the item
used on the experimental task (PASSION data is missing
for three autistic individuals due to school absence
during data collection). The Participant Assessment of
Significance of Special Interests and OccupatioNs
(PASSION) questionnaire was developed specifically for
this study to allow us to assess the nature of the partici-
pants’ interest in the item used in their personalized
task. The PASSION questionnaire was based on previous
parental-report measures of special interest [8] (M.
South, A. Klin, S. Ozonoff: The Yale Special Interests
Interview, unpublished), and was a brief, self-report ver-
sion that is more appropriate for adolescents and young
adults. This measure was used to investigate whether
there was a difference between our autistic participants
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and neurotypical controls in the self-reported interest
regarding the item in question. A systematic difference
in the level of interest in the two groups (e.g., less strong
interests in the neurotypical group) might have under-
mined the validity of the experimental task results. The
15-item questionnaire was designed to assess different
key aspects of a passion/interest including level of im-
portance to the individuals, whether the interest inter-
feres with daily functioning, level of expertise in interest,
duration of interest and whether the individual pos-
sessed any other interests. All items, except for one ask-
ing participants to list any other interests they
possessed, were scored on a Likert scale (Full details of
the questionnaire can be found in the “Additional files”
section (see Additional file 1).
Scores for each subscale (importance, interference,
expertise, duration of interest, number of other inter-
ests) were calculated for each participant (15 neuroty-
pical, 11 autistic). For full questionnaire, see the
“Additional files section. Independent T tests showed no
difference between the groups on any subscale (all p values
>.39). On average, both groups indicated that the interest
was very important, but they somewhat disagreed
with the idea that the interest interfered with daily
functioning (work, school, relationships, etc.). They
felt that they knew a bit more than others who have
the same interest, and their interests had generally
lasted between 3 and 5 years. In both groups, the ma-
jority of participants had one or two additional im-
portant interests (see Table 3 for details).
Results
Accuracy
Accuracy was high (>92%) for both groups (see
Table 4). Mean proportion correct values for each
participant, for each condition, in both groups were
submitted to a mixed-factor ANOVA. There was a
main effect of congruency (F (1, 27) = 5.15, p = .032,
ηp
2 = 0.16): the accuracy rates were higher for the con-
gruent trials; no other main effect or interaction
approached significance (all p values >.2).
Reaction time
Median reaction time (RT) for correct trials in each con-
dition was calculated for each participant (see Table 3).
Table 2 Summary of different interests
Special interest/hobby Diagnostic group
(autism/neurotypical)
Magic Autism






Super Smash Bros Autism








Premier League Football Both groups
My Little Pony Both groups
Table 3 Average scores for each group on each subscale of the
PASSION questionnaire (with SD in brackets)
Autism Neurotypical Significance (p)
Mean number of interests 1.5 (1.8) 1.6 (1.6) 0.94
Mean importance score 3.9 (.39) 4.2 (.85) 0.37
Mean interference score 2.2 (1.1) 2.7 (1.2) 0.35
Mean expertise score 4.2 (.65) 4.4 (.40) 0.5
This is important, as it confirms that differences in the experimental task are
not due to different levels of interest or expertise in the two groups








Autism (n = 14, all males) Mean 19:04 46 55 101
(SD) (7:4) 7 11 12
Range 13:0–32:6 35–58 36–80 84–128
Neurotypical (n = 15, all males) Mean 18:04 64 56 118
(SD) (2:3) 5 9 10
Range 13:9–20:8 52–72 37–68 99–136
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The median was used, rather than the mean, to avoid
extreme values (which may result from momentary
lapses in concentration) disproportionately influencing
the average. A mixed ANOVA was performed using
diagnosis group as a between-subject factor and both
perceptual load (set-size) and distractor congruency as
the within-subject factors.
There was a significant main effect of set size, (F (3,
81) = 207.3, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.89), congruency (F (1, 27) =
6.91, p = .014, ηp
2 = 0.20), and diagnostic group (F (1, 27)
= 8.85, p = .006, ηp
2 = 0.25). This reflects the fact that RT,
increased as the perceptual load of the task increased,
was slower for incongruent than congruent trials (966
and 947 ms respectively) and that the autistic partici-
pants were slower than the neurotypical controls (ASD:
M = 1064 ms; neurotypical: M = 848 ms). There was a
significant interaction between set size and group (F (3,
81) = 9.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.25), between congruency and
group (F (1, 27) = 15.3, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.36), and between
set size and congruency (F (3, 81) = 3.06, p = .033, ηp
2 =
0.10). Inspection of the means suggests that the latter re-
flects the fact that the congruency effect declined as set
size increased.
To further investigate the significant group interac-
tions, repeated measure ANOVA was carried out for
each group separately. The control group showed a
stable significant congruency effect (F (1, 14) = 84.5, p
< .001, ηp
2 = 0.86) that did not significantly reduce as the
set size increased (no significant interaction, p = .49).
Contrarily, the autism group showed no overall main ef-
fect of congruency (p > .5) but a significant interaction
between set-size and congruency (F (3, 39) = 3.32, p = .03,
ηp
2 = 0.20), i.e., there was a congruency effect at the lower
set sizes, which declined as the load of the task increased
(see Fig. 2). The absence of a congruency effect indicates
that the distractor item is not being processed (i.e., a par-
ticipant is not helped by a congruent picture or hindered
by an incongruent one). As such, the significant inter-
action implies that the neurotypical individuals processed
the distractors related to their items of interest at all levels
of load, whereas the autistic individuals only processed
them at the lowest level of load.
As the groups differed in IQ, this was added as a co-
variate and a repeated measure ANCOVA was run. All
significant main effects and interactions remained, ex-
cept for the main effect of group. This was no longer
significant F (1, 26) = 1.54, p = .226, ηp
2 = 0.06 and sug-
gests that group differences in overall RT were due to
the lower IQ in the autism group.
Experiment 2
The results from experiment 1 indicated that neurotypi-
cal individuals, but not autistic individuals, processed
pictures of items related to their passions/interests at all
levels of perceptual load. In order to confirm that the
persistence of an interference effect in the control group
was due to expertise, a second task using non-special
interest objects was employed. This task, following that
of Lavie and colleagues [44] used pictures and names of
Table 4 Overall mean median RT (ms) and mean accuracy rates (proportion correct) and standard deviations (SD) for the two groups
under congruent (cong.) and incongruent (incong.) distractor conditions at each set size in experiment 1
Set size 1 Set size 2 Set size 4 Set size 6
cong. incong. cong. incong. cong. incong. cong. incong.
Autism RT 745 788 896 894 1226 1162 1410 1395
(SD) 195 206 256 250 329 270 311 354
Accuracy 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92
(SD) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.1 0.13
Neurotypical RT 643 685 703 766 883 912 1068 1129
(SD) 77 81 99 77 138 137 178 204
Accuracy 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.96
(SD) 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06
Fig. 2 Congruency effects of items of interest for the two groups
across all set sizes. Congruency effects (as a proportion of the baseline
RT) were calculated for each person by subtracting average congruent
trial RT from the average incongruent RT and dividing by congruent
RT. This gives a proportionate measure that accounts for individual
differences in RT. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean
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musical instruments, and we ensured that there were no
expert musicians in either group.
Participants
In total 14 participants with autism and 19 typically de-
veloping controls took part in the second experiment.
Sample size was determined by previous research using
similar paradigms [51]. Nine of the autistic participants
and five controls were re-recruited from the first ex-
periment. In these cases, there was a gap of several
weeks between testing sessions, to avoid practice ef-
fects. All other participants were recruited specifically
for the study using the same recruitment methods as
experiment 1.
Participants were aged between 14 and 32 years old
and all had IQs (assessed using the WASI) in the typical
range (>80). As before, diagnosis was confirmed using
the ADOS and the SRS was issued to all controls. Age
and performance IQ were matched between the two
groups. Newly recruited participants were also quizzed
on their personal interests to ensure that they did not
possess a particularly strong interest in musical instru-
ments. Four individuals from the neurotypical group
were excluded due to high SRS levels (above normal
limits, T score >59). Details of the remaining 30 partici-
pants can be seen in Table 5. T tests revealed that the
groups differed on performance on the vocabulary
subtest of the WASI (p = .001) but were not signifi-
cantly different on any other measure, including IQ
(all p values >.1).
Results
Accuracy
Mean proportion correct values for each group under
each condition (set size and distractor congruency) were
calculated (see Table 6). Mixed ANOVA revealed no sig-
nificant main effects or interactions (all p values >.09).
The accuracy rates were consistently high (between 86
and 92%) across all conditions for both autistic and non-
autistic participants.
Reaction time
The same data reduction steps as used in experiment 1
were applied in the present experiment. Median RT for
correct trials in each condition was recorded for each
participant (as in many RT studies, the median was used
rather than the mean, to avoid extreme values dispro-
portionately influencing the average). A mixed ANOVA
was performed using median RT with diagnosis group as
the between subjects factor and set size and congruency
as within-subject factors. There was a main effect of set
size (F (3, 81) = 141.8, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.84) and congruency
(F (1, 27) = 15.3, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.36) but not of group
(p > .4). RT increased with set size (set size 1: 862 ms; set
size 2: 979 ms; set size 4: 1210 ms; set size 6: 1448 ms)
and participants were slower to respond to incongruent
trials (congruent 1103 ms; incongruent 1147 ms), but
there was no overall difference in RT between the autistic
and non-autistic participants. There was a significant
interaction between set size and congruency (F (3, 81) =
4.0, p = .01, ηp
2 = 0.13), suggesting that the congruency ef-
fect decreased as the load of the task increased (see Fig. 3).
No other interactions were significant (all p values > .2).
Discussion
Using selective attention tasks personalized for each par-
ticipant’s passions and interests, our results show that,
for neurotypical individuals, interest and expertise ap-
pear to increase the salience of items related to these in-
terests. Given that individuals with autism are widely
reported to show patterns of intense interest in certain
topics, we had expected them to show increased distrac-
tion by images relating to their circumscribed interes-
t—even when performing tasks with high perceptual
load. Surprisingly—and in contrast to our initial predic-
tions—we did not see this pattern in the autism group;
interest items and non-interest items were treated in the
same way: processed at lower levels of load and ignored
under higher levels of load. Given our earlier findings of
lack of attentional priority for social images [36], this
pattern of results supports our second hypothesis








Autism (n = 14, all males) Mean 19:04 51 60 109
(SD) (7:0) 8 12 12
Range 13:0–32:6 39–66 46–80 89–128
Neurotypical (n = 15, all males) Mean 17:04 63 56 117
(SD) (2:4) 9 12 15
Range 13:0–20:9 46–80 34–74 90–147
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outlined above: that there is reduced/absent
specialization to any class of stimuli in autism. The in-
clusion of a self-report measure of interest (PASSION)
rules out the possibility that our unexpected result might
be due to reduced intensity of interests in our specific
group of individuals with autism. It is possible that the
two groups had differing levels of insight and conse-
quently accuracy, in their self reports. However, it is not
clear how that would impact on the findings (i.e., would
autistic people overestimate or underestimate the impact
of their interests). It may be interesting in future re-
search to include a parent-report version of the ques-
tionnaire. In the self-report version employed here,
results showed there was little to differentiate the two
groups in any of the subscales within the measure and
that both groups reported high levels of interest and ex-
pertise. In addition, it should be noted that the current
study only involved male participants. It has been shown
that circumscribed interests differ in frequency (reduced
in females, [56, 57]) and content (random objects/toys ra-
ther than mechanical items, [58]) and intensity between
males and female and therefore the findings presented
here may not reflect the entire autistic population. Subse-
quent studies with females (autistic and non-autistic) will
be important to further explore this area.
This aside, our findings are surprising given that much
of the previous literature has found autistic individuals
show disproportionate attention to “high autism inter-
est” items, compared to neutral items (e.g., [47–49] as
discussed in our introduction above). However, our
methods were different from those used in previous
studies, allowing us to measure a distinct aspect of at-
tention to items of interest. First, our use of a control
group comprised of neurotypical individuals with pas-
sions and interests allowed us to examine the qualitative
differences between circumscribed interests in autism
and typical passions—rather than revealing group differ-
ences that may be an artifact of differing prevalence of
interests across the two populations. Second, in the
current study, we used a selective attention task with
competing distractors, rather than a free-viewing para-
digm. We were therefore able to demonstrate that the
processing of images related to interests and expertise is
not automatic and mandatory for autistic people,
whereas it is for neurotypical individuals. These findings
do not necessarily contradict previous findings but build
on them: indicating that despite high levels of interest
on passive tasks, this is not accompanied by an increase
in salience which would lead to automatic priority for at-
tention, even when items of interest compete with the
primary task.
Though unexpected, these findings have interesting
implications. For example, they are consistent with the
body of research that suggests individuals with autism
show atypical patterns of neural specialization. Studies
have shown that autistic individuals—unlike neurotypical
individuals—fail to show activation in the fusiform gyrus
during face perception [59, 60], with the patterns of acti-
vation more closely resembling the activity observed
during feature-based object recognition in the
Fig. 3 Congruency effects of non-interest items for the two groups
across all set sizes. Congruency effects (as a proportion of the baseline
RT) were calculated for each person by subtracting average congruent
trial RT from the average incongruent RT and dividing by congruent
RT. This gives a proportionate measure that accounts for individual
differences in RT. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean
Table 6 Overall mean median RT (ms) and mean accuracy rates (proportion correct) and standard deviations (SD) for the two
groups under congruent (cong.) and incongruent (incong.) distractor conditions at each set size for Experiment 2
Set size 1 Set size 2 Set size 4 Set size 6
cong. incong. cong. incong. cong. incong. cong. incong.
Autism RT 808 923 965 1022 1231 1298 1509 1490
(SD) 176 170 217 188 222 282 353 279
Accuracy 0.92 0.86 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.9 0.86
(SD) 0.08 0.1 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.1 0.15
Neurotypical RT 815 905 939 989 1142 1167 1418 1377
(SD) 224 302 217 261 315 260 317 280
Accuracy 0.9 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.88 0.9
(SD) 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.09
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neurotypical population [59]. Altered, reduced, or absent
neural specialization for their interests may underlie the
lack of automatic attentional priority observed in the
present behavioral study.
Secondly, our findings may reflect an altered balance
between top-down and bottom-up attentional influences
in autism. The Enhanced Perceptual Functioning ac-
count of autism suggests that many diagnostic features
of autism are due to an increased influence of bottom-
up signals on attention relative to that of top-down fac-
tors [61]. Indeed, the authors go as far as to suggest that
top-down influences are mandatory in neurotypical indi-
viduals but optional in autism. Evidence from imaging
studies suggests that an increased reliance on bottom-up
processes might be responsible for the increased per-
formance found on cognitive tasks such as the block
design [62]. This reliance on bottom-up processes is
thought to be promoted by a reduction in top-down
influences [63].
The possibility of a reduction in top-down modulation
of attention has been proposed in autism as a cause of
some of the difficulties social and non-social symptoms
observed in the condition such as abnormal social gaze
[64] and reduced susceptibility to visual illusions. Eye-
tracking data obtained by Neumann and colleague
(2006) indicates that the increased tendency to focus on
the mouth rather than the eyes found in autism occurs
despite a lack of group differences in bottom-up atten-
tion, suggesting that reduced top-down influences on
eye movement are responsible for atypical face process-
ing. This diminished influence of top-down factors is
also thought to manifest as some of the non-social as-
pects of ASD, such as reports of reduced susceptibility
to visual illusions in autism [65, 66]. Further support for
this theory comes from reports of abnormal influence of
categorical knowledge in during a discrimination task,
showing that categorical concepts, while still being ac-
cessible, exert less of a top-down effect on perception in
individuals with autism [67]. These results are analogous
with our findings that suggest that circumscribed inter-
ests are maintained but do not lead to a top-down influ-
ence on attention.
Our results are also in line with recent Bayesian expla-
nations of visual perception in autism, suggesting that a
relative bias toward incoming sensory information over
prior perceptual experience results in the differences in
visual processing reported in the autism literature [68].
In neurotypical individuals, a reduced neural response to
repeated, and thus more predictable, stimuli is seen
[69, 70]. However, reduced adaptation has been re-
ported in autism during both face perception [71]
and gaze detection [71, 72]. Support for this in non-
social domains comes from recent findings of reduced
repetition suppression being associated with higher
levels of autistic traits [73]. Repetition suppression re-
fers to the reduction in the neural response to stimuli
when participants are repeatedly exposed to them
[74]. Ewbank’s finding indicates that repeated experi-
ence to stimuli, as is found in circumscribed interests,
has an attenuated effect on the neural responses to
these familiar stimuli and provides further evidence
for reduced top-down influences on attention in aut-
ism. This result has also been linked to some of the
clinical symptoms of the condition, such as repetitive
behaviors and insistence on sameness [73]. Similarly,
it could be these difficulties in the brain’s ability to
adapt or habituate to repeated actions or items related to
circumscribed interests that lead to such fixations on
particular interests. Indeed, it is worth noting that the
existence of such a reduction in neural response to re-
peated stimuli is in line with both reports of increased
occurrence of intense circumscribed interests in autism
and our present findings that suggest possible reduced
neural specialization to stimuli. Therefore, although on
first sight counterintuitive, the results we report seem
to support a body of the current research and are in
keeping with many of the prominent perceptual theories
of autism.
It is also important to consider what the practical im-
plications might be of having strong passions that do
not appear to change the salience of items related to this
interest. Perhaps it results in individuals having to work
harder for the same level of reward. For example, in
neurotypical attention, items related to interests would
capture attention automatically, breaking into awareness
as the top-down attention system prioritizes it over
other competing items. The reward is gained without
the individual needing to actively search for such items.
If this top-down system was attenuated or absent then
individuals would have to dedicate more effort to inter-
act with items of circumscribed interest for the same re-
ward. This could manifest as the intense levels of
interest and an unwillingness to divert from restricted
topics that are both characteristic of autistic circum-
scribed interests. While a full discussion of motivation
and cognitive control is beyond the scope of the current
paper, this suggestion of a more active dedication of at-
tentional resources to items of interest may resonate
with the recent finding that motivational responses in
autistic individuals are greater in response to generic
“high autism interest” items [75] which in turn leads to
less effortful cognitive control in the presence of such
items [76]). Further research on a neural level is clearly
warranted in order to explore these suggestions; how-
ever, for now our behavioral demonstration that autistic
circumscribed interests are not accompanied by an in-
crease in attentional salience, offer potential insights into
the unique cognitive profile of the condition.
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Conclusions
Overall, our results indicate that while attentional pro-
cessing in neurotypical individuals is strongly influenced
by prior experiences related to their interests, autistic in-
dividuals do not show this effect. This is despite the fact
that they hold similarly intense interests to the neuroty-
pical individuals tested. We have summarized possible
cognitive mechanisms that could explain the disparity
observed here. Indeed, taken alongside the literature on
the lack of attentional salience for faces in autism, these
results may provide preliminary support for atypical
neural specialization in autistic individuals.
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